Weekly Explosive Incident Brief: 2026/02/17 – 2026/02/23

Ed Bundy -
February 26, 2026
Weekly Explosive Incident Brief

Executive Snapshot

  • Pakistan saw the deadliest single attack this period: A suicide bombing at a Shia mosque in Islamabad on 6 Feb killed 32 and wounded 170+. IS-KP claimed responsibility. A follow-on SVBIED/assault on a Bajaur checkpoint on 16 Feb killed 11 soldiers (TTP claimed). Pakistan conducted retaliatory airstrikes into Afghanistan on 22 Feb.
  • Coordinated IED campaign targeting Ukrainian police: Three IED attacks in 48 hours (Lviv 22 Feb, Mykolaiv 23 Feb, Dnipro 23 Feb) killed one officer and wounded 32+. Ukrainian officials attribute the campaign to Russian intelligence recruitment via Telegram. The Lviv attack used a classic double-tap ambush pattern against first responders.
  • Moscow IED attack on invasion anniversary: A remotely-detonated device killed one police officer outside Savyolovsky railway station on 24 Feb. Putin stated the bomber was recruited online; the IED was activated remotely.
  • Sahel mass-casualty events continue: JNIM launched coordinated assaults on multiple Burkinabe military bases Feb 14-16 (Tandjari, Bilanga, Nare, Ouahigouya), with internal diplomatic estimates putting the combined toll above 180 killed — described as the largest coordinated jihadist operation ever seen in Burkina Faso. Niger recorded multiple IED incidents including a roadside bomb near Diffa killing 8+ and an IED near Niamey killing 3 soldiers.
  • Syria ISIS IED activity persists: An IED on the Deir Ezzor-Mayadeen road destroyed a bus carrying defense ministry personnel on 12 Feb, killing 5 and wounding 13. ISIS cells remain active across eastern Syria.
  • Colombia ELN technological escalation: The ELN used FPV drones combined with IEDs to attack the San Jorge military base in Arauca — the first confirmed FPV drone attack in Colombia’s conflict. Separately, authorities raided an ELN bomb factory in Bogota with capacity for ~70 IEDs, reportedly intended for pre-election attacks.
  • Thailand Deep South insurgency active: A bomb concealed in a fire extinguisher killed 1 and wounded 11 (including 7 police) outside a Yala supermarket on 22 Feb. Seven additional bomb attacks struck Narathiwat on 14-15 Feb.
  • Nigeria IED threat expanding in the northwest: Multiple IED incidents along the Zamfara highway corridor, including destruction of a Nigerian Army APC. ISWAP attacked a military FOB in Borno on 5 Feb, killing 4 soldiers.
  • Myanmar drone-bomb attack on airport: A suicide drone struck a passenger aircraft at Myitkyina Airport on 20 Feb — the first such attack on a Myanmar airport. Attributed to KIA/PDF resistance forces.
  • Notable TTP trend — anti-police targeting: At least four separate incidents this week (Lviv, Mykolaiv, Dnipro, Moscow) specifically targeted law enforcement with IEDs, suggesting a deliberate campaign pattern in the Russia-Ukraine context. The Yala, Thailand attack also primarily struck police.

Incident Ledger

#CountryCity/AreaCategoryTypeDeviceTargetCasualtiesConfidence
1PakistanIslamabadTerrorDetonationPBIED (suicide vest + firearm)Shia mosque / worshippers32 killed, 170+ woundedConfirmed
2PakistanBajaur, KPKTerrorDetonation + AssaultSVBIED + small armsMilitary checkpoint11 soldiers + 1 child killed; 12 attackers killedConfirmed
3UkraineLvivTerror (state-directed)Detonation2x IED (waste bin concealed, phone-initiated)Police first responders1 killed, 25 injuredConfirmed
4UkraineMykolaivTerror (state-directed)DetonationIEDPolice (shift change)7 injured (2 critical)Confirmed
5UkraineDniproTerror (state-directed)DetonationIEDPolice station0 casualties; building/vehicle damageConfirmed
6RussiaMoscowTerrorDetonationIED (person-delivered, remote-initiated)Police vehicle / officers1 officer + bomber killed, 2 injuredConfirmed
7Burkina FasoTandjari, GourmaTerror/ConflictAssault + DetonationSmall arms + IEDsForestry/paramilitary post~40-50 killed (JNIM claims 50)Probable
8Burkina FasoBilanga, Nare, OuahigouyaTerror/ConflictAssaultSmall arms + IEDsMilitary basesCombined toll est. 180+ (diplomatic sources)Probable
9NigerBartchawal, TillaberiTerror/ConflictDetonationRoadside IEDMilitary patrol3 soldiers killed, 10 injuredConfirmed
10NigerBaroua, DiffaTerror/ConflictDetonationRoadside IEDMixed transport vehicle8+ killedProbable
11NigerNationwideConflictDiscovery/Disruption3x IEDs (2 defused, 1 detonated)Military operationsNo casualties from IEDsConfirmed
12NigeriaZamfara (Keta-Danjibga road)Criminal/TerrorDetonationBuried IEDArmy APC escorting convoyCasualties unclear; APC destroyedProbable
13NigeriaZamfara (Gusau-Funtua Hwy)Criminal/TerrorDetonationBuried IEDCommercial truck0 killed; 2 injured; truck destroyedConfirmed
14NigeriaAuno, BornoTerrorAssaultSmall arms + explosivesMilitary FOB + police posts4 soldiers killedProbable
15SyriaDeir Ezzor-Mayadeen roadTerrorDetonationRoadside IEDBus (defense ministry personnel)5 killed, 13 woundedConfirmed
16SyriaAbu KamalTerrorDetonationMotorcycle-borne IEDNot specified1 killedProbable
17ColombiaSaravena, AraucaConflictDetonation + AssaultFPV drones + IEDsMilitary base (San Jorge)2 soldiers killed, 27 injuredConfirmed
18ColombiaBogota (Usme)ConflictCache find/Disruption~70 IED componentsPre-election targets (planned)0 (disrupted)Confirmed
19ThailandBannang Sata, YalaTerror/InsurgentDetonationIED in fire extinguisher (shrapnel-packed)Supermarket / police1 killed, 11 injured (7 police)Confirmed
20ThailandYalaInsurgentDetonationRoadside IEDMilitary patrol vehicle1 soldier injuredConfirmed
21ThailandNarathiwat (Yi-ngo, Ra-ngae)InsurgentDetonation (x7)Homemade bombsShops/property0 casualtiesConfirmed
22MyanmarMyitkyina, KachinConflictDetonationSuicide drone (explosive-laden)Passenger aircraft on runway0 killed (aircraft damaged)Confirmed
23USALas Cruces, NMUnknownDiscoverySuspected explosive deviceFound in donation center0Confirmed
24USAHillcrest Heights, MDCriminalDiscoveryHomemade pipe bombStorage unit0Confirmed
25MexicoCDMXCriminalHoax/ThreatNone foundFederal judiciary building0 (evacuation of 1,000+)Confirmed (hoax)

CARD 1: Islamabad Mosque Suicide Bombing

Location/Time: Tarlai Kalan, Islamabad, Pakistan | 13:38 local (PKT) | 6 February 2026

Category / Context: Terror — Sectarian (anti-Shia)

Incident Type: Detonation (suicide)

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): A single suicide bomber approached the Khadija Tul Kubra Mosque during Friday prayers. Security guards at the entrance challenged him; the bomber opened fire, engaged in a brief gunfight with volunteer security, was shot in the thigh by a wounded volunteer, and then detonated his explosives at or near the entrance. CCTV confirmed detonation at 13:38.

  • Device Type: PBIED (suicide vest with explosive charge + personal weapon)
  • Delivery & Placement: Person-borne; attempted penetration of mosque entrance
  • Initiation Method: Self-initiated (suicide)
  • Target Type: Shia mosque during Friday prayers — mass casualty intent
  • Effects: 32 killed, 170+ wounded. Significant structural damage to mosque.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: IS-KP / Islamic State — Khorasan Province (claimed via Telegram with bomber photo). Pakistani authorities arrested 4 facilitators including an “Afghan Daesh mastermind.” Pakistani military stated planning/training occurred in Afghanistan.
  • Confidence: Confirmed.
  • Source Reliability: High — Multiple independent wire services, official Pakistani government statements, IS claim with photo.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Deadliest attack in Islamabad since the 2008 Marriott bombing. The attack pattern (firearm engagement followed by suicide detonation at a chokepoint) is consistent with IS-KP methodology. Pakistan’s retaliatory airstrikes into Afghanistan on 22 Feb signal significant regional escalation.

CARD 2: Bajaur Checkpoint SVBIED + Assault

Location/Time: Bajaur District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan | Night of 16 February 2026

Category / Context: Terror — Insurgent (TTP)

Incident Type: Detonation + Armed assault

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): Militants drove an explosives-laden vehicle toward a military checkpoint near the Afghan border. When security forces signaled it to stop and blocked entry to a residential compound, the vehicle was rammed into the checkpoint wall, causing a structural collapse. A follow-on ground assault was launched but repelled; security forces killed 12 attackers in the ensuing firefight.

  • Device Type: SVBIED (vehicle-borne IED) + small arms
  • Delivery & Placement: Vehicle-borne; driven to target checkpoint
  • Initiation Method: Victim/driver-operated (suicide)
  • Target Type: Military checkpoint / security compound
  • Effects: 11 soldiers and 1 child killed; 7 wounded. 12 attackers killed.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) — claimed responsibility. Attacker later identified as Afghan national.
  • Confidence: Confirmed.
  • Source Reliability: High — ISPR (Pakistan military) statement, multiple wire services.

Sources:

Analyst Note: The SVBIED-plus-assault TTP is a hallmark of TTP operations along the Afghan border. Combined with the Islamabad mosque bombing, this attack contributed directly to Pakistan’s decision to conduct cross-border airstrikes into Afghanistan on 22 Feb, significantly escalating regional tensions.

CARD 3: Lviv Double-Tap IED Ambush on Police

Location/Time: Danylyshyna Street, Lviv, Ukraine | ~00:30 local (EET) | 22 February 2026

Category / Context: Terror — State-directed (attributed to Russian intelligence)

Incident Type: Detonation (double-tap ambush)

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): At approximately 00:30, police received a call reporting a break-in at a store. The first IED detonated shortly after the initial patrol arrived. A second device detonated as backup units and emergency services gathered at the scene — a textbook double-tap designed to maximize casualties among first responders. Devices were concealed in waste bins and equipped with mobile phones for remote detonation.

  • Device Type: 2x IED (concealed in waste bins, phone-initiated remote detonation)
  • Delivery & Placement: Pre-positioned in waste bins outside a store; lured victims via false emergency call
  • Initiation Method: Remote command (mobile phone)
  • Target Type: Police first responders (deliberate ambush)
  • Effects: 1 killed (Officer Viktoria Shpylka, 23), 25 injured (12 hospitalized, 2 critical). Nearly all casualties were law enforcement.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: Russian intelligence services (per Ukrainian officials). Perpetrator identified as a 33-year-old woman from Rivne, recruited via Telegram, who purchased explosive components commercially and assembled devices on order from a “curator.” Detained within 10 hours near the Polish border.
  • Source Reliability: High — CNN, Ukrainska Pravda, Kyiv Independent, official SBU/Interior Ministry statements.

Sources:

Analyst Note: The double-tap TTP targeting first responders via a false emergency call is a signature associated with sophisticated adversaries. The use of commercially sourced components and Telegram-based recruitment represents a low-cost, scalable attack model. This attack initiated a 48-hour wave of anti-police IED attacks across Ukraine (Mykolaiv, Dnipro). EOD/CT professionals should note the lure-and-ambush methodology.

CARD 4: Mykolaiv Gas Station IED — Police Targeted

Location/Time: Mykolaiv, Ukraine | ~18:10 local (EET) | 23 February 2026

Category / Context: Terror — State-directed (attributed to Russian intelligence)

Incident Type: Detonation

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): An IED detonated at a disused petrol station in Mykolaiv as seven patrol police officers gathered for a shift change. The device was pre-positioned at a location known to be used by police for routine handovers.

  • Device Type: IED (specifics not published)
  • Delivery & Placement: Pre-positioned at known police gathering point
  • Initiation Method: Not specified in open sources
  • Target Type: Police officers during shift change
  • Effects: 7 police officers injured (2 in critical condition). Police vehicles damaged.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: Russian intelligence services (per Ukrainian National Police chief and SBU).
  • Confidence: Probable — attributed by Ukrainian officials but no arrest announced at time of reporting.
  • Source Reliability: High — Ukrainska Pravda, Kyiv Independent, Ukrinform, official police/SBU statements.

Sources:

Analyst Note: The targeting of a known police shift-change location indicates pre-operational surveillance. Combined with Lviv and Dnipro (same 48-hour window), this constitutes a coordinated anti-law-enforcement IED campaign. The pattern suggests multiple recruited operatives rather than a single cell.

CARD 5: Dnipro Police Station IED

Location/Time: Amur-Nyzhniodniprovskyi district, Dnipro, Ukraine | ~20:30 local (EET) | 23 February 2026

Category / Context: Terror — State-directed (attributed to Russian intelligence)

Incident Type: Detonation

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): An IED detonated at a police administrative building approximately 2 hours after the Mykolaiv attack. No personnel were present in the immediate blast zone.

  • Device Type: IED Delivery & Placement: Placed at/near police building
  • Initiation Method: Not specified in open sources
  • Target Type: Police station / administrative building
  • Effects: No casualties. Windows shattered, office equipment and furniture destroyed, nearby vehicle damaged.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: Russian intelligence services (per Ukrainian officials). Fourth IED incident targeting Ukrainian police in 48 hours.
  • Confidence: Probable.
  • Source Reliability: Medium-High — Ukrainska Pravda, Kyiv Post, regional prosecutor’s office statement.

Sources:

Analyst Note: The zero-casualty outcome may indicate timing error, incomplete surveillance, or a device designed primarily for psychological effect and disruption. The 48-hour clustering with Lviv and Mykolaiv strongly suggests coordinated campaign planning.

CARD 6: Moscow Savyolovsky Railway Station IED

Location/Time: Savyolovsky Railway Station Square, Moscow, Russia | ~00:00+ local (MSK) | 24 February 2026

Category / Context: Terror (Ukraine-Russia conflict context)

Incident Type: Detonation

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): A man approached three traffic police officers on duty at Savyolovsky Railway Station Square and placed/detonated an IED near their patrol car. The bomber died at the scene. Putin stated the device was activated remotely, suggesting the bomber may not have intended self-detonation — or that a handler triggered the device. The bomber reportedly traveled from St. Petersburg to Moscow, retrieved the IED from a pre-positioned cache, and executed the attack on the night of 23-24 Feb — the 4th anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

  • Device Type: IED (person-delivered, remote-initiated per Putin’s statement)
  • Delivery & Placement: Person-carried to target location near police vehicle
  • Initiation Method: Remote command (per Putin); possibly unwitting carrier
  • Target Type: Traffic police officers / patrol vehicle
  • Effects: 1 police officer killed (senior lieutenant, father of two), bomber killed, 2 officers injured.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: Ukrainian intelligence services (per Russian officials). Putin stated the bomber was recruited via the Internet.
  • Confidence: Confirmed (attack occurred; attribution to Ukraine is Russian government claim).
  • Source Reliability: High — Al Jazeera, Moscow Times, Anadolu Agency, multiple Russian and international outlets.

Sources:

Analyst Note: The timing on the invasion anniversary is almost certainly deliberate. Putin’s statement that the IED was “remote-initiated” and the bomber may have been unaware of the package contents raises the possibility of a manipulated courier / unwitting delivery mechanism — a TTP with significant implications for force protection. This follows the Dec 2025 car bomb killing of Lt. Gen. Sarvarov in Moscow, indicating a sustained campaign against Russian security/military targets within the capital.

CARD 7: Burkina Faso — JNIM Coordinated Multi-Base Assaults

Location/Time: Tandjari (Gourma), Bilanga, Nare, Ouahigouya, Burkina Faso | 14-16 February 2026 (wave of attacks over the weekend)

Category / Context: Terror/Conflict — Jihadist insurgency

Incident Type: Assault + Detonation (multiple simultaneous)

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): JNIM launched near-simultaneous assaults on multiple military/paramilitary positions across northern and eastern Burkina Faso. The main attack struck the forestry post at Tandjari, north of Fada Ngourma. Internal diplomatic reports described “unprecedented coordination” across several provinces. JNIM also overran the military base at Barga (Lorum province).

  • Device Type: Small arms + IEDs (mixed assault methodology)
  • Delivery & Placement: Ground assault with explosive support
  • Initiation Method: Various
  • Target Type: Military bases, forestry/paramilitary posts
  • Effects: Estimated 40-50 killed at Tandjari alone (JNIM claims 50). Combined toll across all attacks estimated 180+ per diplomatic sources. Exact numbers disputed.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: JNIM (al-Qaeda-linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims). Claimed responsibility.
  • Confidence: Confirmed (JNIM claim + multiple diplomatic/security sources).
  • Source Reliability: Medium — Casualty figures from diplomatic sources and JNIM claims; Burkinabe government has not publicly confirmed total losses. AFP, Arab News, Ghana Peace Journal.

Sources:

Analyst Note: The scale and coordination of these assaults demonstrate JNIM’s growing operational capacity despite the junta’s counterinsurgency efforts. The forestry post at Tandjari was a relatively soft target. The simultaneous multi-axis approach strains thin Burkinabe response capacity. Combined with ISSP’s separate expansion, the Sahel IED/assault threat is at its highest recorded level.

CARD 8: Niger — Roadside IED Kills Soldiers Near Niamey

Location/Time: Bartchawal, Tillaberi Region, Niger | Late evening, approximately mid-February 2026

Category / Context: Terror/Conflict — Jihadist insurgency

Incident Type: Detonation

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): An army patrol vehicle struck a buried IED on the Niamey-Filingue road axis, approximately 20 km from the capital, while returning from routine operations.

  • Device Type: Roadside IED (buried/command wire — specifics not published)
  • Delivery & Placement: Buried roadside on patrol route
  • Initiation Method: Not specified (likely victim-operated or command)
  • Target Type: Military patrol vehicle
  • Effects: 3 soldiers killed, 10 injured. Casualties evacuated to Niamey.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: Not claimed; suspected jihadist groups operating in Tillaberi.
  • Confidence: Confirmed (Counter-IED Report).
  • Source Reliability: Medium-High — Counter-IED Report, regional security sources.

Sources:

Analyst Note: The proximity to Niamey (20 km) is significant — it demonstrates that jihadist groups can emplace IEDs along major axes very close to the capital, consistent with the broader pattern of IS-Sahel reaching toward Niamey (including the airport attack).

CARD 9: Niger — Diffa Roadside Bomb

Location/Time: Near Baroua, Diffa Region, Niger | ~09:30 local | 10 February 2026

Category / Context: Terror/Conflict

Incident Type: Detonation

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): An IED struck a mixed transport vehicle (carrying passengers and goods) near Baroua in Niger’s Diffa region.

  • Device Type: Roadside IED
  • Delivery & Placement: Roadside, targeting vehicle route
  • Initiation Method: Not specified (likely victim-operated)
  • Target Type: Mixed civilian/commercial transport
  • Effects: 8+ killed, others injured. Vehicle destroyed.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: Suspected ISWAP/Boko Haram elements operating in Diffa.
  • Confidence: Probable — based on location and targeting pattern.
  • Source Reliability: Medium — Local accounts cited by regional security reports; limited independent verification.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Diffa is a known ISWAP operating area near the Nigerian border. The targeting of civilian transport suggests either indiscriminate placement or deliberate economic disruption targeting commercial movement.

CARD 10: Nigeria — Zamfara Highway IED Destroys Army APC

Location/Time: Keta-Danjibga road, Tsafe LGA, Zamfara State, Nigeria | Mid-February 2026

Category / Context: Criminal/Terror — Bandit insurgency

Incident Type: Detonation

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): A Nigerian Army Armoured Personnel Carrier struck a planted explosive device while escorting civilian motorists along the Keta-Danjibga road. The IED “blasted and scattered” the APC. The Keta-Danjibga axis is notorious for repeated bandit ambushes combining IEDs with direct fire.

  • Device Type: Buried IED (sufficient yield to destroy an APC)
  • Delivery & Placement: Buried roadside on known escort route
  • Initiation Method: Not specified (likely victim-operated pressure plate or command)
  • Target Type: Military APC / escort convoy
  • Effects: APC destroyed. Casualty figures not confirmed. Panic among travelers.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: Armed bandits / Lakurawa terrorist group.
  • Confidence: Probable.
  • Source Reliability: Medium — Sahara Reporters, local police confirmation.

Sources:

Analyst Note: IED yields sufficient to destroy an APC indicate either enhanced HME charges or recovered military ordnance. The northwest Nigeria IED threat has escalated significantly; bandit groups are adopting TTPs previously associated with Boko Haram/ISWAP in the northeast. EOD capability in this region remains limited.

CARD 11: Nigeria — Zamfara Highway IED (25 Feb)

Location/Time: Kuceri-Magazu villages, Tsafe LGA, Zamfara State, Nigeria | Early hours, 25 February 2026

Category / Context: Criminal/Terror — Bandit insurgency

Incident Type: Detonation

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): An IED detonated on the Gusau-Funtua highway when a commercial cement truck drove over the device. EOD units deployed.

  • Device Type: Buried IED (pressure-activated)
  • Delivery & Placement: Buried in highway surface
  • Initiation Method: Victim-operated (pressure)
  • Target Type: Likely intended for military/escort convoy; struck commercial vehicle
  • Effects: Truck cab destroyed; driver rescued alive; 2 injured. No fatalities.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: Bandits.
  • Confidence: Confirmed (police spokesperson statement).
  • Source Reliability: High — Channels TV, Sahara Reporters, Telegraph Nigeria, police confirmation.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Second IED on the same highway corridor within days. Pattern suggests systematic mining of transportation routes — a significant escalation for northwest Nigeria.

CARD 12: Syria — Deir Ezzor Bus IED

Location/Time: Near Saalu village, Deir Ezzor-Mayadeen road, Syria | 12 February 2026

Category / Context: Terror — ISIS insurgency

Incident Type: Detonation

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): An IED detonated as a bus carrying oil facility guards affiliated with the Syrian Defense Ministry passed along the main road between Deir Ezzor and Mayadeen cities, near Saalu village.

  • Device Type: Roadside IED
  • Delivery & Placement: Roadside, targeting known commuter route
  • Initiation Method: Not specified (likely command-detonated given target specificity)
  • Target Type: Defense ministry personnel / oil facility guards on commuter bus
  • Effects: 5 killed, 13 wounded (including civilian bystanders).
  • Suspected Perpetrator: ISIS cell (per SOHR). No formal claim.
  • Confidence: Probable.
  • Source Reliability: High — AFP via Arab News, SOHR.

Sources:

Analyst Note: ISIS cells in Deir Ezzor continue to demonstrate the ability to conduct targeted IED attacks despite ongoing US airstrikes (Operation Hawkeye Strike). The targeting of oil facility guards on a known commuter route indicates pre-operational surveillance. SOHR documented 151 ISIS operations (armed attacks + explosions) in NE Syria since early 2025, confirming a sustained IED campaign.

CARD 13: Colombia — ELN FPV Drone + IED Attack on Arauca Base

Location/Time: San Jorge Military Base, Saravena, Arauca, Colombia | February 2026

Category / Context: Conflict — ELN guerrilla

Incident Type: Detonation + Assault

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): ELN militants attacked the Colombian Army’s San Jorge base using first-person-view (FPV) drones carrying improvised explosive payloads combined with ground-level IEDs. This was the first officially recognized FPV drone offensive attack in Colombia’s armed conflict. The base’s existing anti-drone system failed to neutralize the threat.

  • Device Type: FPV drones with explosive payloads + ground IEDs
  • Delivery & Placement: Aerial drone delivery + ground emplacement
  • Initiation Method: Remote (FPV operator) + various
  • Target Type: Military base Effects: 2 soldiers killed, 27 injured.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: ELN — Juan Fernando Porras Martinez front.
  • Confidence: Confirmed.
  • Source Reliability: High — The City Paper Bogota, Infobae, Insight Crime, Counter-IED Report.

Sources:

Analyst Note: This is a significant TTP evolution. FPV drone attacks have proliferated in Ukraine and the Middle East, but this marks their confirmed arrival in Latin American conflict. The ELN reportedly maintains a guerrilla training network for drone operations spanning Colombia and Venezuela. Authorities report 400+ drone incidents, 914 grenades launched, 212 injuries, and 53 security force deaths from drone attacks to date. Counter-UAS capability gaps at fixed installations are now a confirmed vulnerability.

CARD 14: Colombia — Bogota ELN Bomb Factory Raid

Location/Time: Barrio Chico, Usme locality, Bogota, Colombia | 25 February 2026

Category / Context: Conflict — ELN guerrilla

Incident Type: Cache find / Disruption

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): Colombian Army and police, with US DEA collaboration, raided a clandestine ELN workshop in southern Bogota operated by alias “Plumilla,” identified as the ELN’s urban explosive fabrication specialist. The facility had capacity to manufacture approximately 70 IEDs. Authorities stated the devices were intended for attacks during the upcoming March 8 legislative and May 31 presidential elections.

  • Device Type: ~70 IED components (various types adapted for urban operations)
  • Delivery & Placement: N/A — disrupted before deployment
  • Initiation Method: N/A
  • Target Type: Planned: election-related targets
  • Effects: Disrupted. No casualties.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: ELN urban structure.
  • Confidence: Confirmed (Defense Minister statement, arrests).
  • Source Reliability: High — Infobae, El Pais Colombia, Defense Ministry.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Disruption of a 70-device production facility in the national capital is significant. The ELN’s ability to establish urban fabrication capacity in Bogota — despite their announced ceasefire for elections — indicates parallel military and political tracks. The 2024 ICRC figure of an 89% increase in explosive attack victims in Colombia underscores the trend.

CARD 15: Thailand — Yala Supermarket Bombing

Location/Time: Bannang Sata district, Yala Province, Thailand | Night of 22 February 2026

Category / Context: Terror/Insurgent — BRN separatist

Incident Type: Detonation

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): A bomb concealed inside a fire extinguisher, packed with steel shrapnel, detonated outside a Mini BigC supermarket on Highway 10. The timing coincided with the eve of former PM Thaksin Shinawatra’s visit to Thailand’s deep south.

  • Device Type: IED concealed in fire extinguisher (fragmentation — steel shrapnel)
  • Delivery & Placement: Placed outside supermarket entrance
  • Initiation Method: Not specified in open sources
  • Target Type: Commercial venue / police presence
  • Effects: 1 civilian killed (Tuan Ibrawheng Nimi), 11 injured (7 police officers, 4 civilians).
  • Suspected Perpetrator: BRN (Barisan Revolusi Nasional) separatist movement. Not formally claimed.
  • Confidence: Probable (consistent with insurgent pattern; timed to political visit).
  • Source Reliability: High — Bangkok Post, Nation Thailand, Vietnam Plus.

Sources:

Analyst Note: The fire-extinguisher concealment method is a notable TTP adaptation — the device blends into commercial environments and carries significant shrapnel capacity. The timing before a high-profile political visit follows established BRN patterns of using violence to embarrass Bangkok’s governance claims.

CARD 16: Thailand — Narathiwat Seven-Bomb Series

Location/Time: Yi-ngo and Ra-ngae districts, Narathiwat Province, Thailand | Overnight, 14-15 February 2026

Category / Context: Terror/Insurgent — BRN separatist

Incident Type: Detonation (x7)

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): Seven homemade bomb attacks struck across two districts overnight. Perpetrators split into multiple teams executing attacks at staggered times starting at 23:00. Targets were commercial properties (shops).

  • Device Type: Homemade bombs (7 devices)
  • Delivery & Placement: Placed at commercial properties
  • Initiation Method: Not specified
  • Target Type: Shops / commercial property
  • Effects: Property damage; no injuries reported.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: BRN-affiliated insurgents.
  • Confidence: Probable.
  • Source Reliability: Medium-High — Nation Thailand.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Seven coordinated attacks in one night demonstrates operational depth and logistical capacity in the deep south. The zero-casualty outcome may indicate intimidation/economic disruption intent rather than mass casualty targeting.

CARD 17: Myanmar — Drone Bomb Strike on Myitkyina Airport

Location/Time: Myitkyina Airport, Kachin State, Myanmar | ~20:45 local | 20 February 2026

Category / Context: Conflict — Civil war (resistance vs. junta)

Incident Type: Detonation (drone-delivered)

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): A suicide drone carrying explosives struck a Myanmar National Airlines passenger aircraft as it prepared for departure from Myitkyina to Mandalay. This was the first recorded drone attack on a Myanmar airport. On the same night, artillery shells struck residential areas in Myitkyina city.

  • Device Type: Explosive-laden suicide drone (UAS-borne IED)
  • Delivery & Placement: Aerial drone strike
  • Initiation Method: Remote (drone operator)
  • Target Type: Passenger aircraft / airport
  • Effects: Minor fire damage to aircraft; no passenger injuries reported. Mother and child injured by separate artillery impacts in residential area.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) / People’s Defense Force (PDF) — per junta statement.
  • Confidence: Probable.
  • Source Reliability: Medium — Moemaka News, junta statement. Independent verification limited due to restricted media access.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Drone attacks against aviation targets represent a significant escalation in Myanmar’s civil war. While KIA/PDF forces have used drones for some time, targeting a civilian airport and passenger aircraft crosses a threshold with potential international implications. The junta responded with airstrikes in the following days.

CARD 18: USA — Las Cruces, NM — Device Found in Donation Center

Location/Time: 2340 N. Main St., Las Cruces, New Mexico, USA | ~12:00 local (MST) | 3 February 2026

Category / Context: Unknown

Incident Type: Discovery

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): Employees at a Savers Donation Center discovered a suspected explosive device among donated items. The Dona Ana County Bomb Squad responded, secured and removed the device. An explosives detection K-9 cleared the store.

  • Device Type: Suspected explosive device (specifics not published)
  • Delivery & Placement: Mixed in with donated goods
  • Initiation Method: N/A (not detonated)
  • Target Type: None apparent (likely abandoned/discarded)
  • Effects: No injuries. Store evacuated ~1.5 hours.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: Unknown. Likely inadvertent donation.
  • Confidence: Confirmed (police statement).
  • Source Reliability: Medium — KRWG Public Media, local police.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Routine EOD response. Device discovery in donation/secondhand contexts occurs periodically in the US. No indicators of deliberate targeting.

CARD 19: USA — Hillcrest Heights, MD — Pipe Bomb Found

Location/Time: 4410 Suitland Road, Hillcrest Heights, Maryland, USA | Date in February 2026

Category / Context: Criminal

Incident Type: Discovery

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): Prince George’s County Fire Department Bomb Squad responded to a homemade pipe bomb discovered in a storage unit. No explosion occurred.

  • Device Type: Homemade pipe bomb
  • Delivery & Placement: Found in storage unit
  • Initiation Method: N/A (not detonated)
  • Target Type: None apparent
  • Effects: No injuries, no explosion. No immediate threat.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: Unknown.
  • Confidence: Confirmed (fire department spokesperson).
  • Source Reliability: Medium — WUSA9.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Routine EOD discovery and render-safe. No indicators of broader plotting.

CARD 20: Nigeria — Borno ISWAP Attack on Military FOB

Location/Time: Auno, Konduga LGA, Borno State, Nigeria | ~23:00 local | 5 February 2026

Category / Context: Terror — ISWAP

Incident Type: Assault

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): Suspected ISWAP fighters simultaneously attacked military forward operating bases, the police crack squad position, and rapid response squad in the Auno community.

  • Device Type: Small arms + explosives (specifics not published)
  • Delivery & Placement: Direct assault
  • Initiation Method: Various
  • Target Type: Military FOB, police positions
  • Effects: 4 soldiers killed.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: ISWAP.
  • Confidence: Probable.
  • Source Reliability: Medium — Counter-IED Report, Washington Post context piece.

Sources:

Analyst Note: ISWAP maintains offensive capability against hardened military positions in Borno. Combined with the expanding IED threat in Zamfara, Nigeria faces a two-front explosives threat from both the northeast and northwest.

CARD 21: Mexico — CJNG Bomb Threat to Federal Judiciary (Hoax)

Location/Time: Insurgentes Sur, Mexico City, Mexico | 25 February 2026

Category / Context: Criminal — Cartel intimidation

Incident Type: Hoax/Threat

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): A phone call from a man identifying himself as a CJNG member triggered evacuation of a Federal Judiciary building in southern Mexico City. Over 1,000 people evacuated. Police “Zorros” task force conducted a thorough search; no explosive device was found.

  • Device Type: None (hoax)
  • Delivery & Placement: N/A
  • Initiation Method: N/A
  • Target Type: Federal judicial infrastructure
  • Effects: Major disruption; no casualties.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: CJNG (claimed in call). Occurred days after killing of cartel leader “El Mencho.”
  • Confidence: Confirmed (hoax).
  • Source Reliability: High — La Jornada, Infobae Mexico, Excelsior.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Post-El Mencho CJNG instability may generate increased bomb threats and actual explosive use in Mexico. The targeting of judicial infrastructure is consistent with cartel intimidation of the legal system. While this was a hoax, Mexican criminal groups have increasingly adopted IEDs — Insight Crime has documented the trend.

CARD 22: Scotland — Shetland UXO Controlled Explosion

Location/Time: Former Scatsta Airport site, Shetland, Scotland | 20-21 February 2026

Category / Context: ERW/UXO

Incident Type: Disruption (controlled explosion)

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): Police Scotland confirmed bomb disposal experts carried out a controlled explosion on suspected ordnance discovered at the former Scatsta Airport site. The ordnance was believed to be a WWII-era device. A cordon was established as a precaution.

  • Device Type: Suspected WWII-era ordnance
  • Delivery & Placement: Discovered during site work
  • Initiation Method: N/A (controlled demolition)
  • Target Type: N/A (legacy UXO)
  • Effects: No casualties. Controlled disruption.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: N/A — legacy ERW.
  • Source Reliability: Medium — Shetland Times, Police Scotland.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Routine ERW response. Scatsta has yielded multiple WWII-era ordnance finds in recent years.

Appendix: Notable Developments Outside Primary Reporting Window

Pakistan Airstrikes into Afghanistan (22 Feb 2026): Pakistan conducted multiple airstrikes in Nangarhar and Paktika provinces, Afghanistan, killing at least 18 people, in retaliation for the Islamabad mosque bombing and Bajaur attack. Afghanistan’s Taliban government promised an “appropriate response.” This represents a significant regional escalation.

Sweden Gang Bombings (Ongoing): No specific February 2026 incidents were identified with sufficient detail for individual cards, but the trend continues: 317 gang-related explosions in 2024 (up from 149 in 2023). The Feb 2026 sentencing of two Swedish Foxtrot gang members for the Oct 2024 Israeli embassy grenade attack in Copenhagen highlights the nexus between organized crime, gang violence, and state-actor exploitation (Iran recruitment allegations).

Denmark — Israeli Embassy Grenade Attack Sentencing (3 Feb 2026): Two Swedish nationals (18 and 21) sentenced to 12 and 14 years for throwing grenades at Israel’s embassy in Copenhagen in October 2024. The younger admitted to Foxtrot criminal network membership. Prosecutors described the network as acting as “the armed wing of a Middle Eastern terrorist organization in Denmark.”

US-Caribbean Strikes (Ongoing): The US military continued Operation Southern Spear, striking alleged drug-trafficking vessels. At least 151 people killed in 44+ strikes since September 2025. While not IED-related, this represents a significant kinetic campaign in the hemisphere.

Data Gaps and Limitations

  • Burkina Faso casualty figures are disputed and unverifiable through open sources; the Burkinabe junta restricts media access.
  • Sweden/Scandinavia February 2026 specific incidents were not surfaced with sufficient detail despite multiple searches; the daily bombing trend is well-documented but individual incident reporting is fragmented.
  • China returned no explosive incident results for this period despite targeted searches including Chinese-language terms.
  • Caribbean/Central America returned minimal explosive incident reporting for this period beyond the US naval strike campaign.
  • EU mainland (France, Germany, Spain, etc.) returned no explosive device incidents for this specific period.
  • Northern Ireland — No February 2026 incidents surfaced; the most recent viable device incidents were from January 2026 (West Belfast, North Belfast).
  • Somalia — No specific al-Shabaab IED/bomb attacks were surfaced for February 2026 despite intensified US airstrikes in the country. AFRICOM noted al-Shabaab’s “increased reliance on ambushes and IEDs” but specific incident details were not found.

End of Brief – Next scheduled brief: Monday 3 March 2026

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