Weekly Explosive Incident Brief: 2026/02/23 – 2026/03/01

Ed Bundy -
February 28, 2026
Weekly Explosive Incident Brief

Audio Summary

NOTE: This reporting period coincides with three major geopolitical escalations that dominate the explosive incident picture: (1) Pakistan-Afghanistan open war (26-28 Feb), (2) US-Israel strikes on Iran / Iranian retaliation (28 Feb onward), and (3) ELN countrywide armed strike in Colombia (23-28 Feb). These events generated massive volumes of conventional munitions employment (airstrikes, artillery, missiles) which fall outside the IED/explosive device scope of this brief. Only IED, improvised explosive, and criminal explosive incidents are carded below. The conventional conflict context is summarized in the Appendix.

Executive Snapshot

  • Moscow IED kills police officer on invasion anniversary (24 Feb): A 22-year-old man from Udmurtia detonated a device beside a police patrol car at Savyolovsky Railway Station. One officer killed, bomber killed, two officers wounded. Putin stated the IED was remote-initiated and the bomber was recruited online. This follows a sustained pattern of IED attacks inside Russia targeting security personnel.
  • Ukraine anti-police IED campaign continues: The Lviv double-tap (22 Feb, carried over from prior week), Mykolaiv shift-change attack (23 Feb), and Dnipro police station IED (23 Feb) all fall at the start of this period. Ukrainian officials attribute the coordinated campaign to Russian intelligence recruiting operatives via Telegram.
  • Nigeria Zamfara highway IED (25 Feb): Pressure-plate IED destroyed a cement truck on the Gusau-Funtua highway. Same corridor as the APC destruction the prior week. EOD deployed. Systematic route mining confirmed.
  • ISWAP commander killed by own faction’s IED (24 Feb, Borno): Senior commander Abu Kasim died from an IED emplaced by his own ISWAP faction, triggering internal discord. A second commander (Amir Musa) was subsequently killed in related internal confrontation. This intra-group fratricide may degrade ISWAP operational cohesion.
  • Colombia ELN armed strike (23-28 Feb): The ELN declared a nationwide armed strike, deploying cylinder bombs on key roadways, bombing a police station in Norte de Santander (killing an ambulance driver in crossfire), and killing two police officers in a bomb attack in Cali. At least 3 dead, 13 departments affected. The Bogota bomb factory raid (25 Feb, ~70 IED components) occurred during this strike.
  • Syria ISIS IED at 86th Division HQ, Al-Bukamal: An IED detonated inside the headquarters of the 86th Division in Al-Bukamal (Deir Ezzor governorate). ISIS also claimed responsibility for assassinations in Mayadin and Raqqa, and declared a “new phase of operations” against the Syrian government.
  • Pakistan-Afghanistan open war (26-28 Feb): Pakistan declared “open war” on Afghanistan after Taliban forces attacked Pakistani border posts on 26 Feb. Pakistan launched Operation Ghazab Lil Haq, bombing Kabul, Kandahar, and border installations. While predominantly conventional (airstrikes, artillery), IED/mine threats along the Durand Line are now significantly elevated.
  • US-Israel strikes on Iran (28 Feb): Operation Roaring Lion / Operation Epic Fury struck targets across 24 of Iran’s 31 provinces, killing Supreme Leader Khamenei and senior officials. Iranian retaliation struck Israel, Iraq, and Gulf states. While entirely conventional, the second-order IED implications (Houthi maritime resumption, Iran-backed militia activation, Hezbollah posture) are addressed in the Appendix.
  • UK ERW: East Lothian controlled explosion (23 Feb): Suspected ordnance found at Broadsands beach, North Berwick. 13-hour cordon; controlled demolition by EOD specialists. No casualties.

Incident Ledger

#CountryCity/AreaCategoryTypeDeviceTargetCasualtiesConfidence
1RussiaMoscow (Savyolovsky)TerrorDetonationIED (person-delivered, remote-initiated)Police officers / patrol car1 officer + bomber killed, 2 injuredConfirmed
2UkraineMykolaivTerror (state-directed)DetonationIEDPolice (shift change)7 injured (2 critical)Confirmed
3UkraineDniproTerror (state-directed)DetonationIEDPolice station0 casualties; building damageConfirmed
4NigeriaZamfara (Gusau-Funtua Hwy)Criminal/TerrorDetonationBuried IED (pressure-plate)Commercial truck0 killed; 2 injuredConfirmed
5NigeriaBorno (Lake Chad Basin)Terror (internal)DetonationIED (factional)ISWAP commander Abu Kasim1 killed (commander)Confirmed
6ColombiaNationwide (13 depts)ConflictDetonation / DisruptionCylinder bombs + IEDsPolice, roads, infrastructure3+ killed (incl. 2 police in Cali)Confirmed
7ColombiaBogota (Usme)ConflictCache find / Disruption~70 IED componentsPre-election targets (planned)0 (disrupted)Confirmed
8SyriaAl-Bukamal, Deir EzzorTerrorDetonationIED86th Division HQNot specifiedProbable
9SyriaMayadin, Deir EzzorTerrorDetonationMotorcycle-borne IED / shootingSecurity personnel1 soldier killedConfirmed
10MyanmarMyinmu Twp, SagaingConflictDetonationRoadside IEDCivilian1 injured (shrapnel)Confirmed
11ScotlandNorth Berwick, East LothianERW/UXODisruptionSuspected ordnanceN/A (legacy)0Confirmed

CARD 1: Moscow Savyolovsky Railway Station IED

Location/Time: Savyolovsky Railway Station Square, Moscow, Russia | ~00:00+ local (MSK) | 24 February 2026

Category / Context: Terror (Ukraine-Russia conflict context)

Incident Type: Detonation

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): A 22-year-old man from Russia’s Udmurt Republic approached three traffic police officers on duty and detonated an IED beside their patrol car. The bomber died at the scene. Putin stated the device was activated remotely, suggesting the bomber may not have controlled detonation. The bomber reportedly traveled from St. Petersburg to Moscow, retrieved the IED from a pre-positioned cache, and executed the attack on the 4th anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

  • Device Type: IED (person-delivered, remote-initiated per Putin’s statement)
  • Delivery & Placement: Person-carried to target location near police vehicle
  • Initiation Method: Remote command (per Putin); possibly unwitting carrier
  • Target Type: Traffic police officers / patrol vehicle
  • Effects: 1 police officer killed (Senior Lt. Denis Bratushchenko), bomber killed, 2 officers injured and hospitalized.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: Ukrainian intelligence services (per Russian officials). Putin stated the bomber was recruited via the Internet.
  • Confidence: Confirmed (attack occurred; attribution to Ukraine is Russian government claim only).
  • Source Reliability: High — Al Jazeera, Moscow Times, Novaya Gazeta Europe, Fox News, multiple international outlets.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Putin’s statement that the IED was “remote-initiated” raises the possibility of a manipulated courier / unwitting delivery mechanism. TASS reporting linked this to a broader pattern, noting three police officers killed by remotely detonated devices in late 2025 and 2026. This follows the Dec 2025 car bomb killing of Lt. Gen. Sarvarov in Moscow. Anniversary-timed attacks should be expected annually. The TTP of online recruitment, pre-positioned cache, and remote initiation represents a scalable model.

CARD 2: Mykolaiv Gas Station IED — Police Targeted

Location/Time: Mykolaiv, Ukraine | ~18:10 local (EET) | 23 February 2026

Category / Context: Terror — State-directed (attributed to Russian intelligence)

Incident Type: Detonation

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): An IED detonated at a disused petrol station as seven patrol police officers gathered for a shift change. The device was pre-positioned at a location known to be used by police for routine handovers. This was the second attack in the 48-hour anti-police IED campaign (following Lviv on 22 Feb, reported in prior brief).

  • Device Type: IED (specifics not published)
  • Delivery & Placement: Pre-positioned at known police gathering point
  • Initiation Method: Not specified in open sources
  • Target Type: Police officers during shift change
  • Effects: 7 police officers injured (2 in critical condition). Police vehicles damaged.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: Russian intelligence services (per Ukrainian National Police chief and SBU).
  • Confidence: Probable — attributed by Ukrainian officials but no arrest announced at time of reporting.
  • Source Reliability: High — Ukrainska Pravda, Kyiv Independent, Ukrinform.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Targeting of a known shift-change location indicates pre-operational surveillance. The use of police routine patterns as targeting data is a hallmark of sophisticated threat actors. Combined with Lviv and Dnipro (same 48 hours), this confirms a coordinated anti-law-enforcement campaign using multiple recruited operatives.

CARD 3: Dnipro Police Station IED

Location/Time: Amur-Nyzhniodniprovskyi district, Dnipro, Ukraine | ~20:30 local (EET) | 23 February 2026

Category / Context: Terror — State-directed (attributed to Russian intelligence)

Incident Type: Detonation

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): An IED detonated at a police administrative building approximately 2 hours after the Mykolaiv attack. No personnel were in the immediate blast zone.

  • Device Type: IED
  • Delivery & Placement: Placed at/near police building
  • Initiation Method: Not specified in open sources
  • Target Type: Police station / administrative building
  • Effects: No casualties. Windows shattered, equipment destroyed, vehicle damaged.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: Russian intelligence services (per Ukrainian officials). Fourth IED targeting Ukrainian police in 48 hours.
  • Confidence: Probable.
  • Source Reliability: Medium-High — Ukrainska Pravda, Kyiv Post, Kyiv Independent.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Zero-casualty outcome may indicate timing error or psychological-effect intent. The 48-hour clustering with Lviv and Mykolaiv strongly suggests coordinated campaign planning across multiple Ukrainian cities simultaneously.

CARD 4: Nigeria — Zamfara Highway IED (25 Feb)

Location/Time: Kuceri-Magazu villages, Tsafe LGA, Zamfara State, Nigeria | Early hours, 25 February 2026

Category / Context: Criminal/Terror — Bandit insurgency

Incident Type: Detonation

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): An IED detonated on the Gusau-Funtua highway when a commercial cement truck drove over the device. EOD units deployed. This is the same corridor where an Army APC was destroyed by IED the prior week.

  • Device Type: Buried IED (pressure-plate activated)
  • Delivery & Placement: Buried in highway surface
  • Initiation Method: Victim-operated (pressure)
  • Target Type: Likely intended for military/escort convoy; struck commercial vehicle
  • Effects: Truck cab destroyed; driver rescued alive; 2 injured. No fatalities.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: Bandits.
  • Confidence: Confirmed (police spokesperson statement, EOD deployment confirmed).
  • Source Reliability: High — Channels TV, Sahara Reporters, Telegraph Nigeria.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Third IED incident on the Zamfara highway corridor in weeks (APC destruction, this commercial truck strike, plus a separate defusal on Danjibga-Kuncin Kalgo axis on 6 Feb). Systematic route mining now confirmed. Pressure-plate devices on major highways represent an indiscriminate threat to civilian traffic. Nigerian EOD capacity in this region remains limited.

CARD 5: Nigeria — ISWAP Commander Killed by Own Faction’s IED (Borno)

Location/Time: Lake Chad Basin area, Borno State, Nigeria | ~24 February 2026

Category / Context: Terror (internal factional violence)

Incident Type: Detonation

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): Senior ISWAP commander Abu Kasim was killed when an IED planted by elements of his own faction detonated along a route where he was operating. A subsequent confrontation between ISWAP intelligence operative (UIM) Amir Musa and faction members over the circumstances led to Musa’s killing as well.

  • Device Type: IED (factional / fratricidal)
  • Delivery & Placement: Emplaced along route used by target commander
  • Initiation Method: Not specified (likely command or victim-operated)
  • Target Type: ISWAP commander (internal targeting)
  • Effects: 2 senior ISWAP commanders killed; internal discord within faction.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: ISWAP internal faction.
  • Confidence: Confirmed (multiple Nigerian outlets, security analyst sourcing).
  • Source Reliability: Medium-High — Daily Post Nigeria, Zagazola Makama (specialist Borno security journalist), The Cable, Counter-IED Report.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Internal IED use against faction leadership signals deepening fragmentation within ISWAP. This may create short-term operational degradation but could also produce splinter groups with unpredictable targeting. Nigerian security forces may exploit this instability during ongoing Operation Hadin Kai.

CARD 6: Colombia — ELN Nationwide Armed Strike (23-28 Feb)

Location/Time: Nationwide, 13 departments, Colombia | 23-28 February 2026

Category / Context: Conflict — ELN guerrilla

Incident Type: Multiple detonations / disruption

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): The ELN declared a nationwide armed strike “to protest the threat of imperialist intervention.” Cylinder bombs were deployed on key roadways across the country, disrupting land travel. The main Cucuta-Pamplona road in Norte de Santander was closed due to a bomb. A police station in Norte de Santander was attacked (ambulance driver killed in crossfire). Two police officers were killed in a bomb attack in Cali. The armed strike overlapped with the Bogota bomb factory raid on 25 Feb (Card 7).

  • Device Type: Cylinder bombs, IEDs, road-deployed explosives
  • Delivery & Placement: Roadway emplacement, direct attacks on police infrastructure
  • Initiation Method: Various (command, victim-operated)
  • Target Type: Police stations, road infrastructure, economic targets
  • Effects: At least 3 killed (2 police officers in Cali, 1 ambulance driver in Norte de Santander). 13 departments affected. Major road closures.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: ELN (declared/claimed).
  • Confidence: Confirmed.
  • Source Reliability: High — US Embassy Bogota security alert, Latin America Reports, Colombia Reports, S-RM Inform.

Sources:

Analyst Note: The ELN armed strike demonstrates continued ability to project explosive force nationwide despite peace negotiations. Cylinder bombs on highways represent an indiscriminate anti-vehicle threat similar to Zamfara pressure-plate IEDs. This is the second ELN armed strike in three months (December 2025 was the prior one). Combined with the FPV drone attack in Arauca (prior week) and the Bogota bomb factory raid, the ELN’s explosive capability is at peak demonstrated capacity.

CARD 7: Colombia — Bogota ELN Bomb Factory Raid

Location/Time: Barrio Chico, Usme locality, Bogota, Colombia | 25 February 2026

Category / Context: Conflict — ELN guerrilla

Incident Type: Cache find / Disruption

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): Colombian Army and police, with US DEA collaboration, raided a clandestine ELN workshop in southern Bogota operated by alias “Plumilla,” the ELN’s urban explosive fabrication specialist. Capacity for approximately 70 IEDs. Devices reportedly intended for attacks during the March 8 legislative and May 31 presidential elections.

  • Device Type: ~70 IED components (various types adapted for urban operations)
  • Delivery & Placement: N/A — disrupted before deployment
  • Initiation Method: N/A
  • Target Type: Planned: election-related targets
  • Effects: Disrupted. No casualties.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: ELN urban structure.
  • Confidence: Confirmed (Defense Minister statement, arrests).
  • Source Reliability: High — Infobae, Defense Ministry.

Sources:

Analyst Note: 70-device production facility in the capital during an active armed strike confirms the ELN maintains parallel urban fabrication capacity alongside rural operations. The timing — mid-armed-strike, pre-election — indicates operational planning at the strategic level.

CARD 8: Syria — IED at 86th Division HQ, Al-Bukamal

Location/Time: Al-Bukamal (Abu Kamal), Deir Ezzor governorate, Syria | Late February 2026

Category / Context: Terror — ISIS insurgency

Incident Type: Detonation

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): An IED detonated inside the headquarters of the 86th Division in Al-Bukamal, described by SOHR as “security chaos.” This follows the 12 Feb bus IED on the same Deir Ezzor-Mayadeen corridor (reported in prior brief).

  • Device Type: IED (placed inside military facility)
  • Delivery & Placement: Inside military headquarters compound
  • Initiation Method: Not specified
  • Target Type: Syrian military headquarters
  • Effects: Not specified in open sources.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: ISIS cell.
  • Confidence: Probable.
  • Source Reliability: Medium — SOHR.

Sources:

Analyst Note: IED penetration of a divisional headquarters indicates either insider facilitation or significant security gaps at fixed installations. ISIS declared a “new phase of operations” against the Syrian government on 22 Feb, and returning fighters from Badia to urban areas are complicating the security picture.

CARD 9: Syria — ISIS Attack in Mayadin

Location/Time: Mayadin, Deir Ezzor, Syria | 21 February 2026

Category / Context: Terror — ISIS insurgency

Incident Type: Detonation / Shooting

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): ISIS claimed responsibility for an attack on security personnel in Mayadin, killing a soldier. A simultaneous attack in Raqqa killed a civilian. ISIS Telegram channels called for intensified motorcycle-borne attacks.

  • Device Type: Motorcycle-borne IED / firearms
  • Delivery & Placement: Mobile platform
  • Initiation Method: Various
  • Target Type: Security forces
  • Effects: 1 soldier killed; 1 civilian killed (Raqqa).
  • Suspected Perpetrator: ISIS (claimed).
  • Confidence: Confirmed.
  • Source Reliability: Medium-High — Enab Baladi, SOHR, ISIS claim.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Fourth ISIS attack claimed against Syrian government forces this year. Motorcycle-borne platform calls indicate an evolving TTP designed for urban hit-and-run operations.

CARD 10: Myanmar — Roadside IED in Myinmu Township

Location/Time: Near Ngar Kin Village, Myinmu Township, Sagaing Region, Myanmar | ~1 March 2026

Category / Context: Conflict — Civil war

Incident Type: Detonation

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): A roadside IED detonated near Ngar Kin Village. A man with shrapnel injuries was admitted to Mandalay Public Hospital.

  • Device Type: Roadside IED
  • Delivery & Placement: Roadside emplacement
  • Initiation Method: Not specified
  • Target Type: Likely military; struck civilian
  • Effects: 1 civilian injured (shrapnel wounds).
  • Suspected Perpetrator: PDF / resistance forces (per Myanmar junta).
  • Confidence: Probable.
  • Source Reliability: Low-Medium — Myanmar government press release; independent verification limited.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Sagaing Region remains one of the most IED-affected areas in Myanmar. Junta reporting attributes all IEDs to “PDF terrorists” but independent verification is impossible due to media restrictions. The broader conflict context includes Mon-Tanintharyi drone coalition strikes on junta positions during this period.

CARD 11: Scotland — East Lothian UXO Controlled Explosion

Location/Time: Broadsands beach, North Berwick, East Lothian, Scotland | 23 February 2026 (~08:55 detonation)

Category / Context: ERW/UXO

Incident Type: Disruption (controlled explosion)

Incident Summary (TTP-focused): HM Coastguard received reports of suspected ordnance at Broadsands beach at 17:35 on 22 Feb. A 13-hour cordon was established. EOD specialists carried out a controlled explosion at approximately 08:55 on 23 Feb.

  • Device Type: Suspected ordnance (legacy, likely WWII-era)
  • Delivery & Placement: Discovered on beach by public
  • Initiation Method: N/A (controlled demolition)
  • Target Type: N/A (legacy ERW)
  • Effects: No casualties. 13-hour cordon on popular beach.
  • Suspected Perpetrator: N/A.
  • Source Reliability: Medium — Deadline News Scotland, HM Coastguard report.

Sources:

Analyst Note: Routine ERW response. Scottish coastline continues to yield legacy ordnance periodically.

Appendix: Major Conventional Conflict Escalations (Context for IED/CT Analysts)

Pakistan-Afghanistan Open War (26-28 Feb 2026)

On 26 Feb, the Afghan Taliban launched retaliatory ground operations along the border in six provinces (Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar, Khost, Paktia, Paktika) following Pakistani airstrikes on 21 Feb. On 27 Feb, Pakistan launched Operation Ghazab Lil Haq (“Righteous Fury”), bombing Kabul, Kandahar, and Paktia. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared “open war.” Pakistan claimed 274 Afghan fighters killed; the Taliban claimed 55 Pakistani soldiers killed and 19 Afghan civilians dead. By 1 Mar, blasts were still being heard in Kabul as fighting continued.

IED/CT Implications: The Durand Line border area is now an active conventional battlespace. IED/mine threats along border crossing routes are significantly elevated. TTP and IS-KP may exploit the chaos to intensify attacks inside Pakistan. Afghan refugee movements create screening challenges.

US-Israel Strikes on Iran / Iranian Retaliation (28 Feb onward)

Beginning 28 Feb, Israel (Operation Roaring Lion) and the US (Operation Epic Fury) conducted coordinated strikes across 24 of Iran’s 31 provinces, killing Supreme Leader Khamenei. Iran retaliated with missile and drone strikes on Israel, Iraq, and Gulf states. Iraqi Kurdistan was struck by Iranian Shahed drones. Iraqi and Syrian airspace closed.

IED/CT Implications: Iran-backed militias (Islamic Resistance in Iraq, Hezbollah, Houthis) may escalate asymmetric attacks including IEDs against US/Israeli interests regionally. Houthi maritime threats in the Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb may resume. The destruction of Iranian military infrastructure may temporarily degrade state-level support for IED supply chains to proxies, but stockpiled materiel remains in theater. Second-order effects on the IED threat landscape will take weeks to fully manifest.

ELN Armed Strike — Colombia (23-28 Feb)

Covered in Cards 6-7. The armed strike ended 28 Feb. Three killed, 13 departments affected, major road infrastructure disrupted with cylinder bombs. US Embassy issued a security alert.

Data Gaps and Limitations

  • Pakistan-Afghanistan border IED incidents are likely occurring but are obscured by the conventional conflict reporting. No specific IED events could be isolated from the broader combat reporting.
  • Iran — No IED-specific incidents surfaced; all reporting focused on conventional military strikes.
  • Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) — No new IED-specific incidents surfaced for this period beyond the ongoing situation documented in the prior week’s brief. Reporting may be suppressed by the Iran crisis dominating international media.
  • Thailand Deep South — No new incidents surfaced for this specific period (23 Feb – 1 Mar) beyond the Yala supermarket bombing (22 Feb) and Narathiwat series (14-15 Feb) covered in the prior brief.
  • China — No explosive incident results for this period.
  • Caribbean / Central America — No explosive incident reporting for this period.
  • Scandinavia — Sweden gang bombing trend continues but no individual incidents with sufficient detail were surfaced for this specific week.
  • Northern Ireland — No incidents surfaced for this period.
  • Somalia — No specific al-Shabaab IED incidents surfaced despite ongoing US airstrikes.
  • Overall media coverage this week was overwhelmingly dominated by the Iran strikes, Pakistan-Afghanistan war, and to a lesser extent the Colombia armed strike. Routine IED incidents in lower-profile theaters may have gone underreported.

End of Brief — Next scheduled brief: Monday 10 March 2026

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